Pipelines Under Pressure: Ukraine War Hits Kazakhstan Energy Arteries

The war has underscored that risk, prompting Astana to accelerate plans for alternative routes across the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan and Georgia

The ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia continues to have indirect but notable implications for Kazakhstan’s energy sector. Following the September drone attack in Russia’s Novorossiysk that damaged the offices of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) – which exports the majority of Kazakhstan’s oil – another incident has raised concern: the October 19 strike on Russia’s Orenburg Gas Processing Plant, which handles gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field.

The CPC confirmed that its export terminal continued operating after the September 24 incident, though two employees were injured and part of its office complex was damaged. The consortium remains the backbone of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, handling over 80% of national crude shipments to world markets. This concentration has long been viewed as a vulnerability because nearly all flows depend on infrastructure inside Russian territory. The war has underscored that risk, prompting Astana to accelerate plans for alternative routes across the Caspian Sea toward Azerbaijan and Georgia. Astana has been working with Baku and Tbilisi to expand capacity along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), supported by EU and World Bank funding commitments.

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy confirmed that the plant, located about 150 kilometers northwest of Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field across the Russian border, was temporarily shut down following the UAV strike. “According to information from PJSC Gazprom, on October 19, 2025, an emergency situation occurred at the Orenburg gas processing plant as a result of a UAV attack, in connection with which the plant temporarily stopped receiving raw gas from the Karachaganak field.”

The Ministry added that gas supplies to domestic consumers remain unaffected and that consultations are underway with field operators to assess potential disruptions and losses. No details on the extent of the damage or repair timelines have been released by the Russian side. Ukraine’s military confirmed responsibility for the attack as part of its campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, according to statements reported by Interfax-Ukraine and Ukrainska Pravda.

Industry analysts, however, remain cautious. Journalist Oleg Chervinsky noted that the Orenburg plant processes up to nine billion cubic meters of Karachaganak gas annually, a portion of which is returned to Kazakhstan’s northern regions. He warned that a prolonged shutdown could lead to supply shortages, particularly during the winter months. The timing of the Orenburg attack – just before the start of the heating season – adds a seasonal risk dimension.

Olzhas Baidildinov, an expert in the energy sector, criticized delays in constructing a domestic gas processing facility at Karachaganak, arguing that reliance on foreign infrastructure heightens Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to regional conflict and economic disruptions. The replacement of damaged equipment, including components from France’s Technip, could also be complicated by sanctions and supply chain issues, ultimately impacting tariffs and consumer costs.

The cumulative effect of reduced gas processing capacity and potential production slowdowns at Karachaganak could weigh on Kazakhstan’s already strained budget. While some observers note that reduced output may help the country align with its OPEC+ production commitments, previously exceeded at major fields including Kashagan, Tengiz, and Karachaganak, such compliance comes at the expense of export revenue.

In this context, Astana’s muted diplomatic posture toward Kyiv may reflect a broader strategy of balancing competing priorities amid geopolitical and economic uncertainty. The Kazakh government has not publicly criticized drone attacks by Kyiv, and has maintained a neutral stance on the conflict, refusing to recognize the self-proclaimed “quasi-state territories” of Luhansk and Donetsk republics, and restricting the re-export of sanctioned or dual-use goods to Russia.

The Orenburg facility, built in Soviet times and operated by Gazprom Pererabotka, is crucial for both Russia and Kazakhstan. It processes up to nine billion cubic meters of gas annually from Karachaganak – about one-third of the field’s total output – and returns a portion of the processed gas to Kazakhstan for domestic use.

The disruption highlights Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian downstream infrastructure. Because the Karachaganak field produces both oil and large volumes of associated gas, any interruption in gas processing can indirectly constrain oil production. A reduction in gas intake at Orenburg therefore risks curtailing liquids output as well.

Discovered in 1979, Karachaganak was developed in the mid-1980s, and is now operated by the KPO consortium, comprising KazMunayGas (10%), Eni (29.25%), Shell (29.25%), Chevron (18%), and LUKOIL (13.5%). The field contributes roughly 15% of Kazakhstan’s total hydrocarbon production.

Earlier this year, a joint Russian–Kazakh LPG venture associated with Orenburg suspended operations because of EU restrictions on Russian propane and butane exports, underlining the impact of sanctions on cross-border energy projects.

The sequence of attacks on energy infrastructure underscores how the Russia–Ukraine war has spilled over into broader regional energy systems. Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy – maintaining balanced relations with both Moscow and Kyiv while accelerating alternative export routes – reflects a pragmatic effort to shield its economy from conflict spillover and to balance geopolitical risk against economic necessity.

By the Times Of Central Asia.

Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland.

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